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ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN INDIA: NEED FOR 
SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PROBLEM-SOLVING 
Punit Arora 
ABSTRACT 
In review of Indian administrative structure in 1950s, Appleby certified Indian Civil 
Service to be one of the best in the world. While there is still a lot to commend the civil 
service for, this article will focus exclusively on the deficiencies that have crept in the 
services over last few years. This should not be taken to mean that all is wrong with it. 
The article does, however, attempt to present the critique of the service from the 
perspective of an insider with a view to rid it of its malaise. Despite its notable 
achievements, over last five decades, disenchantment with public administration in 
India has dramatically increased. It is criticized for inefficiency, lack of 
professionalism, irresponsiveness, nepotism and corruption.  After the assumption of 
power by UPA government, civil services have come under a real scanner. The 
government appointed an expert committee, under the chairmanship of the Hota 
committee, to review and suggest changes to the administrative structure. The 
committee submitted its report recently. It suggested changes in recruitment and 
performance appraisal system, opening of civil service position to outsiders and 
relaxing norms pertaining to removal from service to shake complacency of the civil 
servants. This article argues that these proposals are too restrictive in nature and 
scope. They are limited to changes in the upper echelon of bureaucracy. These don’t 
just exclude a large part of bureaucracy from the reform efforts, but also fail to address 
the factors external to the administration that hinge upon its performance. To be 
specific, the article presents evidence of the linkage between the deficiencies in the 
political, electoral and judicial system and the decline in performance of civil service. It 
reasons that it is meaningless to talk of administrative reforms without undertaking 
simultaneous reforms in political and electoral system. Finally, it suggests a more 
comprehensive reform agenda to improve the performance of civil service, and above 
all emphasizes the need for adopting the systems approach to problem-solving. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The performance of public administration in India has come under close scrutiny in the 
last few years. Rampant corruption, inefficiencies, wastages and irresponsiveness to the 
needs of citizens are some of the commonly acknowledged problems afflicting the 
administration. While these problems are common to all the levels in government, the 
spotlight has firmly been on the uppermost echelon of the bureaucracy- the Indian Civil 
Service (ICS or service).   
ICS was constituted as Imperial Civil Service in 1886-87 by British colonial rulers and 
has continued virtually in the same form ever since (Indian Civil Service, 2006). When 
the Constituent Assembly gathered to draft the constitution for free India, most of its 
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members were in favor of dissolution of ICS. Given the history of freedom movement 
and the use of State apparatus to curb it, this was not surprising. Most freedom fighters 
did not understand that the service at whose hands they suffered was performing its duty 
to implement the law and the law was not made by the members of the services. It was 
made by a colonial power. However, Sardar Patel who was first Home Minister of India 
felt that without an apolitical, efficient civil service it was well nigh impossible to 
govern and keep India together. In a letter to Prime Minister Nehru, he wrote, “I need 
hardly emphasize that an efficient, disciplined, and contented service, assured of its 
prospects as a result of diligent and honest work is a sine qua non of sound 
administration under a democratic regime even more than under an authoritarian rule. 
The service must be above party and we should ensure that political considerations, 
either in its recruitment or in its discipline and control, are reduced to the minimum, if 
not eliminated altogether." (Nehru, 1999) In the end, he prevailed upon the leadership of 
Indian National Congress and the Constituent Assembly. And ICS was not just retained 
but was granted wide-ranging civil service protections under Article 311 of Indian 
Constitution itself. Once Patel succeeded in convincing the Constituent Assembly about 
the necessity of retaining ICS, the assembly went with him all the way and accepted the 
ICS as it then existed. It felt that the change in the men manning the service by itself 
would make a difference to the way it responded to the Indian public and its 
representatives, the politicians (Nehru, 1999).  
While ICS has basically persisted with this structure without much change till date, its 
performance appears to be on the decline. Admittedly, corruption and inefficiency are 
serious issues facing public administration in India. India is ranked lowly 88
th
 in 
Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, despite being a free 
democratic country with liberal constitutional structure. The Alagh Committee 
appointed to study performance of civil services made a special mention of the decline 
in the levels of integrity among civil servants (Kaur, 2001). Guhan and Paul (1997) 
believe that corruption in India has gone ballistic over the last decade. While there are 
no statistics specific to corruption in the ICS, it is believed that “...over half of the 
officers have joined the politicians in corrupt practices.” (Nehru, 1999) In the first 25 
years of free India, ICS was believed to be largely free of corruption, though it was even 
then often accused of being elitist, remote, and inaccessible to common man. Over next 
quarter century, while it has become more and more accessible, the corruption has been 
steadily shooting up. Apart from corruption, the Alagh Committee noted, “A negative 
orientation, declining professionalism, intellectual sluggishness and a lack of ability to 
acquire new knowledge, un-dynamic outlook and, at times, a complete lack of 
intellectual honesty as some of the other weaknesses of the ICS."  (Kaur, 2001) 
The decay and decline of “steel frame” has increasingly become a matter of concern. In 
early 1950s when Paul Appleby visited India to suggest changes to its administrative 
machinery, he certified Indian Civil Service to be one of the best in the world. ‘This 
scenario began to change after the death of Nehru and other statesmen in mid-1960s. 
The period 1977-80 witnessed the accentuation of some of the malpractices and 
distortions of the political system. Some of these malpractices began to degenerate into 
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ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM 
To address the issue, in the past also, a large number of commissions and expert 
committees have been set up to review the functioning of ICS and administration. These 
expert groups have basically limited their recommendations to making minor 
adjustments to the structure. They have implicitly assumed that the present system to be 
the best possible system, which with minor corrections and modifications can be rid of 
all its evils and shortcomings. Hahn Been Lee, who studied reform efforts in developing 
countries including India believes, “Administrative reforms have mainly been 
associated with staff services such as personnel, budgeting, and organization method. 
Administrative techniques and procedures were the main objects. Few reform projects 
were conceived in terms of substantive programs or institutions.” (Singh, 2005: 24)  
After the assumption of power by Congress-led United People’s Alliance (UPA) at the 
center, reform efforts have gained momentum, partly because UPA government 
contested with an agenda of governance reforms, but mainly because the current prime 
minister is believed to be an honest reformer. While the efforts to reform governance 
have increased and become more concerted, it is surprising that the agenda has not 
altered in its breadth or scope. The reforms that are being suggested include, among 
others, changes in the recruitment and performance appraisal system, opening up of 
senior positions to “outsiders”, increase in emoluments, declaration of assets, 
attachment of ill-gotten property of officials and summary dismissal of corrupt civil 
servants by amending Article 311 of the Constitution. As is easily discernible, these 
changes are still very much within the confines of what may be termed as “Hahn Been 
Lee Limits” -- reform agenda limited to changes in staffing.  
These proposals do not address the core issues and challenges facing the administrative 
services in India. Before going into further details, let us consider what these proposals 
purport to achieve and how far they are likely to succeed. The changes in recruitment 
system envisage reduction in age at the time of recruitment. This recommendation has 
found special favor with training institutions since they feel that increase in average age 
at recruitment has limited their effectiveness in “shaping the trainees” to their liking. 
The government initially toyed with a radical idea of recruiting officers at very young 
age and increasing the length of training to about five years. This position was echoed 
by Cabinet Secretary Chaturvedi, who is the highest ranking bureaucrat in the country, 
said: "At the age of 17-18, their value system can be molded. Molding value system 
when a person is 30 and married with a family is a tall order.” (Chand, 2006) This 
recommendation was slightly modified by the Hota Committee that was appointed by 
UPA government to review and suggest changes to the administrative system. It 
recommended the reduction in the maximum age at recruitment from 30 years to 24 
years with no change in the present system of training for two years.  
The changes in performance appraisal system envisage moving from confidential to 
open appraisal system, and outlining the career path of an officer at the time of annual 
appraisal. In the confidential appraisal system, no officer is theoretically expected to be 
told how his he performed and how he was graded. Therefore, there is no scope for 
feedback unless you get an adverse remark in your appraisal. However, if an adverse 
entry is made, the officer concerned has a right to appeal against it. This involves quasi-
judicial and judicial process, which is entirely too much of an effort in justifying your 
evaluation. As a result, in practice, it is very rare that anyone is given an adverse 
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remark. Over a period of time, this appraisal system has virtually become meaningless. 
It is expected that making performance appraisal system more “private-sector” like 
would help improve the performance of public servants. 
Opening up some civil service positions to non-career civil servants is expected to 
provide competition to career officers and shake them out of complacency. “The main 
problem the civil service faces today is that it is no longer getting the right talent either 
at the junior level or at the top. There are a very few good officers left in the service. 
The first solution, therefore, is to create competition by increasing the supply of good 
officers in the system” (Bhattacharya, 2005) It is suggested that this objective can be 
achieved by inducting top private sector managers in the civil service positions, if 
necessary by giving competitive compensation packages. For existing civil servants, the 
Fifth Pay Commission recommended about 20% increase in the emoluments and 
benefits, and of course this recommendation was promptly accepted. This increase in 
emoluments is supposed to provide some sort of parity between private and public 
sector salaries and lessen the incentives for corruption. Simultaneously, making 
provisions on declaration of assets and attachment of ill-gotten property more stringent 
is expected to act as disincentive to corruption. 
It is also true that civil service protection and widely prevalent belief in life-long job 
security encourages non-performance. Therefore, it makes apparent sense to relax rules 
pertaining to removal from service on grounds of inefficiency, corruption and non-
performance. Therefore, it is suggested that Article 311 of the constitution be amended 
to provide for summary dismissal of civil servants if they exhibit doubtful integrity or 
lack of competence.  
 
WILL THE REFORM AGENDA SUCCEED? 
How radical is this reform agenda and how likely is it to succeed? Let’s briefly consider 
different reform proposals severally at first before anticipating their impact in totality. 
Reduction in age at recruitment essentially is a policy recommendation that advocates 
reverting back to the age limits prevalent in 1970s. For this recommendation to be 
meaningful, a number of factors need to be established. First, it has to be shown that the 
training institutions have higher success rate in molding officers recruited at younger 
age than their older colleagues. Secondly, it has to be established that the younger 
officers show better inclination to stay honest. Third, younger officers show better 
understanding of job requirements and deliver better results. Since there have been no 
empirical studies to substantiate or contradict the recommendation, we will have to limit 
our analysis to the organizational folklore and such other evidence as is available. If this 
recommendation is true, we should expect a difference in the performance of officers 
recruited together, commonly known as batch of officers, but at significant age 
difference. One would also expect all batches prior to mid-1970s to perform better than 
the recent batches. From my knowledge and experience in ICS, unfortunately neither of 
the facts stands up to the scrutiny of the facts. In fact, the organizational folklore 
considers the length of service, and not the age, as the determinant of the decline in 
efficiency and integrity.  
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It is commonly joked around that every year a civil servant loses one column from his 
vertebra and therefore by the time he reaches final lap in service, he has no backbone 
left and bends towards any side the pressure forces him to. “Even comparatively straight 
and honest officers when reaching the end of their career have been known to have 
completely lost their spine in the hope of securing sinecure post-retirement jobs." 
(Mathur, 2004) This view holds that all officers are more or less equally likely to show 
commitment to values, however over a period of time, officers learn to compromise and 
adjust. Of course, there are significant differences in the meaning and the extent of what 
constitutes a compromise to different officers.  
Secondly, it is in a sense in contradiction to the recommendation on professionalizing 
the services. Most recruits entering services at older age are the ones who have graduate 
degrees with practical experiences in management, engineering, accounting, community 
services or other professions. These recruits bring their experience in private 
organizations to the civil service, which has an effect that is similar to opening of the 
profession to outsiders. Because apart from bringing their knowledge, skill, and 
professional ethics; they also tend to have peers in private sector to compete with at a 
personal level.  
Thirdly, wittingly or unwittingly, this recommendation is a negation of gains made by 
lobby for affirmative action. The age limits have been raised in response to demands of 
the experts who felt that it helped poorer and weaker sections to gain entry into the 
system, for unlike students from richer background who could devote their energies 
exclusively to study and prepare for rigorous competition, these people needed to 
support themselves and their education. If this is true, rolling back the age limits would 
help the more affluent or privileged sections within different communities. This 
recommendation, therefore, has the potential to be construed as an attempt by the elite 
to fight back. 
There is a mixed reaction to changes in the appraisal system. Some experts are 
cautiously positive; others believe it to be a minor change. Bhattacharya (2005) states 
considers “...while a transition from a closed and secret system of evaluation to one 
where the officers have the right to know how they are being rated is a positive change, 
it is naïve to believe that the IAS system will permit a group of senior officers to make a 
bold and candid assessment of their colleagues.” (Bhattacharya, 2005) The moot point 
in this respect, however, is that even when the appraisal was confidential, superior 
officers found it extremely difficult to make bold judgments about their junior 
colleagues. Even where they knew an officer to be corrupt or incompetent, they gave 
him a good appraisal most likely out of concerns for political viability or organizational 
culture. If the evaluation is open, in my opinion as an insider, it is extremely likely that 
superior officers will feel more pressured to give a good appraisal report to avoid 
political fall-out. The open appraisal is more likely to succeed if the politicization of 
services is avoided to a substantial degree.  
 
CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE SATISFIED 
Throwing open civil service position to outsiders is a good recommendation if three 
conditions are satisfied. First, there are no officers within the service who can do the job 
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equally good. Second, this option would not be utilized as a mean of patronage and 
nepotism. Third, the people thus hired will be given the autonomy necessary to deliver 
goods. As it happens, in most of the cases, none of these conditions are met to any 
satisfactory result. If competence is the criteria, ICS fortunately is not devoid of talent. 
In fact, of late, tendency to ignore the competent officers has been on the rise. Second, 
in a country just emerging from princely rules and that has long history of nepotism, 
including class and caste considerations, it is not clear that the political class, without 
considerable changes to their accountability mechanism as shown later in the article, 
can be trusted to hire people on the basis of their ability to perform the job better.  
Finally, even when people have been hired directly from outside of civil service, they 
have not been given adequate power, autonomy and responsibility to make any impact. 
In fact, there has hardly been any effort to make change the institutional structures. 
Under the circumstances, merely co-opting private sector managers is not going to be of 
much help. It is also possible that it might exacerbate the problem since higher 
competition in the present scenario translates into higher pressure for pliability, which 
has, of late, been noted as a serious concern with ICS. Chandra (2006: 28), for example, 
notes that, “...the present-day civil servants have become subservient to politicians….. 
They are highly politicized and even divided along party lines and do not seem to mind 
politicians walking all over them so long as the important postings are secured….. Merit 
is no longer the criteria for a posting but factors like money, caste, proximity with 
political bigwigs are.” If it is true, is it advisable to restrict the choice available to 
politicians to civil servants or expand it?  
Provision for disclosure of assets is not a new feature at all. All public servants, 
including politicians, are expected to file their annual property returns -- a provision that 
is breached more often than observed, and such flagrant violation is overlooked without 
any qualms. Finally, let’s discuss the proposal to relax the rules governing disciplinary 
action and removal from the service. It is true that the present rules and norms place 
significant restriction against arbitrary dismissal and provide significant protection to 
civil servants. However, there is no case where the government wanted to remove 
someone but could not because of such protections. Conversely, a large number of cases 
can be cited where officers were found guilty and recommended for removal despite 
such lengthy, involved and cumbersome procedure, but no action was or has been taken 
against them. It suggests that need to search for factors other than the rules and 
procedure that might be the root-cause. In fact, for reasons that are elaborated later in 
this article, I would argue that relaxing these rules will increase the pressure on civil 
servants to be even more pliable, which is contrary to the aims that reformers purport to 
pursue.  
Outlining the agenda and need for reforms, Cabinet Secretary Chaturvedi stated that “he 
wanted non-performers to go out and upright officers to get more protection." (Chand, 
2006: 29)  While I agree with his assertion of the need for weeding out deadwood in 
officialdom, I don’t see how present agenda can help meet this object. In their present 
form, these measures constitute no more than half-hearted tinkering at the edges at best, 
and harmful declension at worst. Even when taken together, they don’t amount to much. 
They are nowhere near as radical as they are made out to be. “These are all marginal 
changes that seek to correct anomalies in the system that could have been eliminated 
long ago.” (Bhattacharya, 2005; 56)  What is even more noteworthy is the fact that the 
proposals do not cover more than 99% of total public administrative staff, which is 
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much more notorious for corruption, inefficiency, irresponsiveness, and pliability 
(Debroy, 2004). In fact, as a result of politicization of this lower level functionaries, 
including state civil services, ICS finds that it doesn’t have adequate control over the 
organizations anymore. The proposals cover neither how they propose to address the 
similar problems at a much higher magnitude with non-ICS employees in the public 
administration, nor how they seek to address this control issue.  
Further, much of what is being advocated now is not new either. “All these are changes 
that have been recommended by some government committee or the other in the last 30 
years." (Bhattacharya, 2005: 151) An editorial in The Hindu riled the government after 
Hota Committee submitted its report. “One wonders what the government does with 
such reports. There was one some years ago by Surendra Nath committee. No one 
knows what happened to it, or to other reports submitted by other distinguished bodies 
such as the 5
th
 Pay Commission." (Ghose, 2006) Most commentators blame the 
bureaucracy for not preventing these recommendations from getting accepted and 
implemented. Ghose (2006: 38), for example, states that, “It is as if these reports are 
simply swallowed up by the bureaucratic machine, and life goes on as usual.”   
 
BUREAUCRATIC RELUCTANCE TO CHANGE 
These commentators ascribe two reasons for bureaucratic reluctance to change. First is 
bureaucratic inertia and lethargy. “One can understand the reluctance of the bureaucracy 
to accept recommendations that would curb its present manner of functioning, and alter 
the rather comfortable manner in which civil servants go about their day-to-day work." 
(Ghose, 2006; 38) The second is their resentment at being perceived as dishonest or 
incompetent. “One can also appreciate that such reports generate a certain amount of 
indignation because, contrary to the picture that is sometimes painted of the services, all 
officers are not a set of dishonest, incompetent people; on the other hand, for the most 
part, they are people who do their work as best they can, are not dishonest, are fairly 
efficient, with some being a little more so than others." (Ghose, 2006: 28)  A survey of 
literature suggests that there has been very little attempt to search for alternative reasons 
for non-implementation of these measures and this seems to be the generally-accepted 
position. This is despite the fact that the politicization of bureaucracy is commonly 
acknowledged to be the major source for decline in the performance of civil service. 
While there is some truth in the allegation, it is not the complete truth. It is flattering, 
indeed, to believe that the services still retain adequate power to stall the changes that 
have been accepted by the popularly elected leaders against their wishes.  
 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS 
This article takes a contrarian view and suggests that the policy-makers are not really 
interested in the real reforms. In other words, what is suggested here is that in the Indian 
context, the problem is not that the agent (bureaucracy) is not responsive to the agenda 
set by the principal (elected representatives), but that the honest and good performance 
by the agent is in fact against the interest of the principal. This essentially means that 
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“civil services suffer more from problems external to them, especially those related to 
the environment in which they function. To put it bluntly, it is the excessive 
politicization of the civil services that hampers their performance, more than anything 
else. (Mathur, 2004) In stating this I don’t mean to exonerate the services of their share 
of culpability. I merely intend to depict a vicious cycle in which public administration in 
India is caught up for the purpose of advocating a holistic, systemic approach for 
satisfactory resolution of the problem.  
The first component of this cycle is the nature of electoral politics in modern 
democracies. As noted by Harold Lasswell, “The competition for occupying or 
controlling the power apparatus of society has become quiet intense. It often assumes a 
form in which no holds are barred." (Bhagat, 1996: 9) This development is accompanied 
by the rise of career politicians. Politics is no longer the preserve of wealthy statesmen 
whose only interest in politics is to perform public service. Today, politician is an 
individual who makes his living by winning the elections (Tullock, 1999: 18).  Now, 
since politics is viewed as an investment that though promises rich dividends but also 
carries high risk due to intense competition, candidates are not unexpectedly willing to 
spend incredible amount of money to win the elections.  
The expensive electoral process, especially in the developing countries, makes it almost 
impossible for an honest politician to get elected. In India, election expenses have been 
spiraling up in recent years. Today, it is very common to spend a million dollars on an 
election to the Parliament of this poor country. To provide an appropriate context for 
this number, if elected, a Member of Parliament can officially expect to receive only 
about 500 dollars a month in salary in return for this investment. Similarly, elections to 
State Assemblies and local governments are prohibitively expensive. Further, frequent 
elections and insecurity often necessitates politicians to aim for early recovery of their 
“investments”.  
This problem has been noted by expert committee after expert committee set up to study 
election process. For example, the Tarakunde committee stated that, “A major malady 
in the operation of elections in India has been the reckless use of money. We recognize 
that many of the obligations imposed on candidates in most keenly contested elections 
cannot be fulfilled successfully without substantial expenditure...The steep rise in 
election expenses is the result of a deliberate preference in favor of money power as a 
major instrument of winning election…the unrestricted use of big money inevitably 
leads to the corruption and distortion of political processes." (Bhagat, 1996: 199)  
This problem was recognized as early as 1971. The Election Commission in its report to 
the Government of India mentioned that, “The parties and candidates would do well to 
remember that apart from all moral considerations, even considerations of pure self-
interest suggest that corrupt practices in the elections should be eliminated. Corrupt 
practice incites corrupt practices, and starts a vicious competition among political 
parties.” (Bhagat, 1996: 259) However, over the succeeding decades, role and influence 
of money in elections has, instead of going down, gone up manifold. 
Of late, there have been some attempts to impose limits on expenditure without much 
success. “In reality, average expenditure in most states is several multiples of ceilings 
determined by law." (Debroy, 2004: 156-157)  It is easy to circumvent the ceilings by 
finding and using the loopholes in laws, for example getting the funds donated to the 
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party and then making the party to spend money on the election of the candidate. This 
loophole was noticed by the Indian Supreme Court in Kanwar Lal Gupta versus 
Amarnath Chawla. The court observed that “If a candidate were to be subject to the 
limitation of the ceiling, but the political party sponsoring him, or his friends and 
supporters were to be free to spend as much as they like in connection with his election, 
the object of imposing the ceiling is completely frustrated and the beneficent provision 
enacted in the interest of purity and genuineness of the democratic process would be 
wholly frustrated." (Bhagat, 1996: 201) After the court asked the government and the 
election commission to plug this loophole, a separate ceiling for party’s contribution 
towards a candidate’s campaign was imposed. However, there are still several 
shortcomings and ambiguities in the laws that permit mind boggling expenditure. And it 
is a continuous tussle between “creative” minds determined to find the loopholes and 
the enforcement to plug those. What complicates the task of enforcing the ceilings is 
that a large portion of expenditure is made by using black money for unaccounted and 
unaccountable purposes like direct distribution of cash to the targeted electorate or 
small-time political operators.    
 
CONCLUSIONS 
If the politicians and political parties willingly spend such huge amounts on elections, it 
is because they expect to collect exorbitant returns on their investments. This “rent 
seeking behavior is therefore endemic to the system. Most of this corruption is in the 
form of control of transfers and postings, which in turn sustains a system of retail 
corruption for a variety of routine services, regulatory functions and direct transfer of 
resources through government programs." (Debroy, 2004: 156-157) What this 
essentially means is that the political ‘entrepreneur’ creates his own supply-chain for 
managing his business. Under his business model, civil servants become distributors- 
wholesaler or retailer depending on their position, and they distribute patronage and 
contracts and collect rent by way of bribes, cuts and kickbacks.  
This worldview is largely favorable to the civil servants. It visualizes civil servants as 
helpless victims at the hands of their political masters who prevent civil servants from 
performing their duties effectively. “Others, and an increasingly large number, view 
politicians and civil servants as the two sides of the same coin, both having joined hands 
in usurping the system for their personal gain." (Mathur, 2004) Whether a civil servant 
is viewed as a victim or a willing accomplice in this game of personal aggrandizement 
at the expense of people, the end result is same. Therefore, we would not be wrong in 
concluding that administrative reforms are intimately intertwined with political reforms. 
In the absence of electoral reforms that make it possible for honest and competent 
politicians to get elected, administrative reforms will not just bear any fruit, but also 
will make honest civil servants more vulnerable to pressure from politicians to align 
their interests with the goal of politicians. Therefore, any reforms of administration 
must be co-terminus with electoral reforms.  
The last interaction is between the society and the governance system in general with 
regard to .the learning behavior of people. “As the vicious cycle of money power, 
polling irregularities and corruption take hold of the system, electoral verdicts cease to 
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make a difference to people." (Debroy, 2004: 156-157) This leads to general 
disenchantment among people with respect to system of governance. Since irrespective 
of who is in the power they continue to be victimized, citizens start maximizing their 
short-term returns by habitually trading votes for money and liquor. Once the voters 
start trading the votes, political class finds itself confronted with a Frankenstein’s 
monster that was largely its own creation.  
This completes the vicious cycle afflicting public administration in India. All the factors 
in the vicious cycle are dynamically linked together, and a change in one factor is likely 
to impact all other factors. To succeed in pushing through a change in this situation, 
broadly two kinds of strategies are available. If the intervention has to be only in one 
sub-system, then it has to be large enough for its impact to be felt in all sub-systems. 
For example, if the corruption can be made significantly riskier or much less lucrative, 
it is theoretically possible to make the prospect of governmental power and position less 
alluring for the dishonest politicians if we assume that we can make the civil service 
completely free of corruption which means that no civil servant would entertain illicit 
demands from politicians. Similarly, the converse is also true. Ridding the political class 
of corruption by itself can rectify the system. In practice, such major changes in one 
sub-system without corresponding changes in other sub-systems are rare. If it is possible 
to make changes in several or all sub-systems, even relatively smaller changes can also 
succeed. There are a number of policy alternatives that satisfy the criteria outlined 
above. What is important to remember is that the intervention should either be large or 
broad enough. It is with this possibility in mind that recommendations are made in the 
succeeding paragraphs. 
As far as civil service is considered, we immediately need to constitute a Civil Service 
Board, fix minimum tenures, introduce result-based management and take the transfers 
out of the control of political class. “The ability of the political executive to transfer 
officers arbitrarily has increased the play of politics in the administration. It enables the 
executive to punish disobedient officials." (Debroy, 2004: 106) The fifth pay 
commission noted the gravity of this problem and suggested detailed guidelines as a 
part of comprehensive transfer policy; including the constitution of a civil service 
board.” (Debroy, 2004: 106) Recently, “Prime Minister Manmohan Singh...exhorted the 
states not to transfer officers frequently. Such exhortations have been made in the past 
too and even courts have taken cognizance of this phenomenon, but things have not 
improved; if anything, the situation has deteriorated over the years." (Mathur, 2004) The 
government needs to move beyond mere exhortations and evolve a consensus, define 
the role of the civil services in the scheme of governance, provide reasonable autonomy 
to the civil service and then hold it accountable for the results.  
I would not recommend any one-best way of achieving this objective. I would rather 
recommend deciding the objectives in each case on the basis of the circumstances 
confronting it. However, I do advocate considering the Agencification model as far as 
practicable. This would necessitate assigning each agency, well-defined goals and its 
chief executives, adequate powers and responsibility to make changes, including to the 
compensation structure, as may be needed to make the agency work. This would also 
restore the control of chief executive on his agency and limit the political interference to 
the minimum necessary level.  
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This would also take care of the problems identified by the Economic Administrative 
Reform Commission. On review of some agencies engaged in development work, it 
stated that, “The targets for each organization were not well-defined. Limits to authority 
were emphasized through audit and other administrative procedures. Accountability was 
stressed through procedural norms rather than on the basis of task performance." 
(EARC, 1983: 3-4) This, though, runs the risk of increase in bureaucratic control, 
irresponsiveness and excesses. To avoid this, the quasi-contracts between the ministers 
and agency heads would need to be lucidly drawn and enforced rigorously. This change 
would need to be accompanied with the changes in the judicial and the political 
structures. Agencification, in particular, requires judiciary to increase its efficiency in 
disposal of cases brought before it. All the effort at reform would amount to nothing 
without making changes in the political system for making it possible for honest people 
to enter the politics and holding them accountable for their actions. This approach again 
emphasizes systems approach, which alone I believe has chance of succeeding in 
achieving the desired goals.  
When A H Hanson, an expert on planned economy, visited India in 1970s he remarked 
that, “The men are able, the organization adequate, the procedures intelligently 
designed. Why have the plans since 1956 so persistently run into crises?" (Debroy, 
2004: 129) Perhaps, the answer to his riddle lies in the fact that the administration in 
India has not embraced systems thinking. And not just that it has shied away from the 
systems thinking, it has also been steadfast in taking the oft-beaten path. If the Indian 
Civil Service is to claim back its fast losing glory, it needs to avoid the fate that 
legendary Sisyphus met. Every time it appeared that he had rolled the huge stone to the 
top of the hill, it rolled back down again. Like Sisyphus, proponents and adversaries of 
the present civil service alike should not remain locked in a tussle to push the same 
agenda down each other’s throats. They need to search for creative institutional 
solutions that best meet the needs of the public service.  
 
Punit Arora, a senior Indian Civil Service Officer, is currently on sabbatical at Maxwell 
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. He has worked for 
private sector, consulting and developmental organizations including United Nations: 
punitsarora@gmail.com 
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